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Abstract 
The expanding use of the improvised explosive device (IED) around the globe requires 
Department of Defense (DoD) government and military organizational leaders and associated 
support staff to focus on achieving actionable intelligence aimed at successfully countering this 
enduring and evolving threat. This annotated bibliography focuses on literature published 
between 2012 and 2016 and discusses the use of decentralized legacy information technologies 
by the DoD and the impact on gathering, analyzing and sharing of critical IED exploitation data.  
 Keywords: actionable intelligence, improvised explosive device (IED), counter-
improvised explosive device (C-IED) operations, legacy information systems, Department of 
Defense (DoD), exploitation, intelligence data 
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Introduction to the Annotated Bibliography 
Problem 
In today’s global counter-terrorism fight, the need to quickly and securely access, share 
and analyze intelligence data from anywhere in the world is a critical requirement, and achieved 
through “bilateral and multilateral exchanges of information and other forms of collaboration” 
(Deni, 2015, p.47). The use of decentralized legacy information technology systems to complete 
information exchanges effects critical global Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) 
exploitation operations for many Department of Defense (DoD) organizations, requiring the 
identification of mission enhancing alternative solutions.   
 Effectively exploiting information and materials from terrorist attacks and related events 
requires enhanced reporting and dissemination of large amounts of associated incident data 
(Obama, 2013). With the increase in data volume and the ever-expanding need to share critical 
intelligence data around the globe, the DoD enterprise infrastructure is evolving to provide more 
technologically enhanced communications and data services to the warfighter. This evolution for 
the DoD presents many counter-terrorism organizations with challenges associated with 
implementing these enhanced services to forward deployed, tactical DoD and government 
defense contractor teams who may be utilizing decentralized legacy equipment and who do not 
always have connectivity back to a United States based network (Witherspoon, Quock, 
Lundberg, Elkins & Christou, 2014). Many existing DoD legacy information technology systems 
are slow, duplicative, and lack interoperability greatly effecting operations (Barno, Bensahel, 
Stokes, Smith & Kidder, 2013). For those counter-terrorism organizations and operational teams 
specifically focused on the fight against the Improvised Explosive Device (IED), secure access to 
data is limited by the lack of efficient and interoperable systems, effectively creating a “critical 
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mission gap” (Carter, 2015, p.1) and an operational environment lacking collaboration amongst 
the many agencies and organizations working to combat these deadly devices. Critical 
information sharing connections remain elusive based on many DoD organizations relying on 
separate databases, and differing methods for securing and facilitating data movement (Rubin, 
Lynch, Escaravage & Lerner, 2014). The differences that exist between organizations also create 
the need for manual intervention in order to successfully execute exploitation data transmission 
for many C-IED organizations. Legacy systems drive the scale of these manual efforts by the use 
of unsupported software operating systems and the lack of consistency in network technology 
implementation (Gosler & Von Thaer, 2013).  
 Access to actionable intelligence. The escalation of IED incidents and related casualties 
during Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom required the DoD to develop and 
implement enhanced technical and forensic IED exploitation techniques to link persons, places, 
things and events (Smith & Tranchemontagne, 2014). The large amounts of collected data 
associated with IED events helps with fusing technical, forensic, and biometric disciplines to 
produce “actionable intelligence” for countering the many terrorist organizations that rely on 
IED’s as a primary weapon in their arsenals (Smith & Tranchemontagne, 2014).    
Given the enduring nature of the global IED problem, careful consideration is required to 
ensure that all intelligence-gathering organizations have the necessary C-IED capabilities and 
capacity to meet future threats (Smith & Tranchemontagne, 2014). One goal for those 
organizations focused on the C-IED effort is to securely gather, analyze, exploit, and share large 
amounts of IED incident and device data in a short timeframe. Sharing data and conducting 
analyses across the government's “legacy stove-pipes of available information” is a challenge for 
many DoD organizations increasing overall analysis timelines for C-IED focused organizations 
LEGACY SYSTEMS AND ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE 7 
 
(Rubin et al., 2014, p.3).  When presented with the opportunity to complete a rapid and thorough 
analysis of all gathered datasets, operational commanders gain the ability to interrupt an enemy’s 
decision cycle and interdict IED tactical employment in real time across the globe (Smith & 
Tranchemontagne, 2014). Further disruption of the enemy’s IED operations are made possible by 
achieving actionable intelligence, mitigating the costs of technical surprise in terms of personnel, 
equipment, and dollars by placing better and more relevant information in the hands of 
warfighters (Smith & Tranchemontagne, 2014). 
Actionable intelligence is “intelligence information that is directly useful to customers for 
immediate exploitation without having to go through the full intelligence production process” 
(Department of Defense [DoD], 2016 p. JP 1-02, 1). The need to securely transfer large amounts 
of intelligence datasets is a critical component of the C-IED fight, and many of the current 
legacy DoD IT systems lack the computing capabilities needed to provide real-time information 
(Barno et al., 2013). The historical DoD legacy system construct includes large amounts of 
highly fragmented and perishable data, and maintained in formats making information difficult 
to discover, correlate and analyze (Voelz, 2015). The use of historical legacy systems by the 
DoD in addition to conducting operations in de-centralized austere environments, forces many 
C-IED organizations to identify new and innovative methods for integrating C-IED information 
and synchronizing C-IED activities (Bennett, 2013). These critical C-IED synchronization efforts 
include a strong focus on establishing a formal process for passing critical IED information and 
individual device advancements to and from interagency partners (Stevens, 2012). Even with 
operational and technological mission-impacting constraints present, many government 
organizations continue to rely upon legacy systems based on the need to preserve their core 
missions and operational functions (Alexandrova, Rapanotti, & Horrocks, 2015). 
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Purpose 
 The purpose of this study is to explore the effects decentralized legacy information 
technology systems have on today’s critical global DoD C-IED exploitation operations in order 
to identify possible mission enhancing alternative solutions. Legacy systems introduce many 
“cross-domain friction points” as noted within the 2013 Annual Report on Army Business 
Transformation (Department of the Army, 2013, p. 6), and make it difficult for leaders, 
operators, and support personnel to achieve increased levels of actionable intelligence in support 
of the current C-IED mission. The current levels of available actionable intelligence require 
development and implementation of new and innovative tactics, techniques and procedures in 
order to successfully combat the global IED threat. 
Audience 
 The intended audience/stakeholders for this study include government and civilian 
military specialists and leadership responsible for the planning and execution of global DoD     
C-IED operations. The primary stakeholders for the study include Intelligence Analysts, 
Information Technology (IT) Technicians and Engineers, Forensic Scientists, Project Managers, 
Program Managers, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) technicians, Combatant Commanders, 
Division Heads, and Company Executives who work to support the global fight against IED’s 
and tasked with focusing current “intelligence and information collection systems” (Flynn & 
Flynn, 2012, p.4). This large group of individuals and organizations would benefit from 
understanding the mission impacting interoperability conditions that exist between new and 
legacy information technology systems, and the need to identify more effective and efficient 
mission enhancing alternatives to obtaining actionable intelligence (Agarwal et al., 2015).  
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Research Questions 
The purpose of this annotated bibliography is to identify literature that examines the use 
of decentralized legacy information technology systems utilized by DoD organizations 
supporting the global fight against IED’s in order to identify possible mission enhancing 
alternative solutions. Focus is on the C-IED exploitation data gathering, analysis and sharing 
operations, and the need to increase actionable intelligence between C-IED organizations. The 
following research questions frame the annotated bibliography: 
Main question. As the escalation of improvised explosive device (IED) incidents and 
related casualties occur as noted by Smith and Tranchemontagne (2014), do the decentralized 
legacy systems used to gather, analyze and share IED exploitation data limit the availability of 
actionable intelligence?   
Sub-questions.  
 Can the currently utilized legacy exploitation data gathering and sharing systems be 
considered resilient DoD systems with the ability to meet changing requirements, 
conform to new environments, and successfully meet the challenges of an adaptive 
foe (Goerger, Madni, & Eslinger, 2014)? 
 Do standalone decentralized legacy exploitation data gathering and sharing systems 
limit the ability to conduct relevant and timely collection, analysis, and technical and 
forensic exploitation of current and emerging IED technologies (Joint IED Defeat 
Organization [JIEDDO], 2012, p.7)? 
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Search Report 
Search strategy. The search strategy identifies relevant and recent published resources 
regarding the DoD’s intelligence gathering, analysis, and sharing operations in support of the   
C-IED fight and the use of legacy information technology and associated combat systems. The 
search focuses on links to organizations operating within the DoD who support the fight against 
IED’s, and the methods and processes for gathering and sharing IED exploitation information 
and creating actionable intelligence. Subsequent searches focus on the tragic events of 9/11, 
counter-terrorism organizational collaboration, data-analysis, and technologically advanced 
combat systems providing increased data availability and relevancy related to the fight against 
the IED. 
Key terms. Gathered search terms originate from scholarly articles, books, published 
white papers, and civilian and government websites focused on the subjects of C-IED data 
gathering and exploitation, legacy information technology systems, and technologically 
advanced combat systems utilized to conduct C-IED operations. Relevant key search terms 
include: 
 
 DoD actionable intelligence; 
 
 9/11 terrorist attacks;  
 
 intelligence data; 
 
 DoD system interoperability; 
 
 DoD legacy IT systems;  
 
 C-IED exploitation data;  
 
 C-IED combat systems; 
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 intelligence data availability and relevancy; 
 
 DoD data storage; 
 
 DoD data analysis; and  
 
 IED exploitation. 
 
Search engines and databases. Searches included extensive use of the online UO 
Libraries via a virtual private network (VPN) connection. Use of the VPN connection provides 
full access to many relevant and scholarly research documents aligned with the study. All 
searches conducted in the UO Libraries databases focused on “articles, books, and more” within 
the “UO + Summit + Articles, etc.” selected search criteria. This provides a unique set of 
database information and identifies potential relevant literature references based on expanded 
search criteria and the effects legacy information technology systems place on DoD C-IED 
organizations. Search engines used included Google and Google Scholar in addition to the UO 
Libraries online search tools. All databases and search engines used for the study include the 
following:  
 IEEE Computer Society Digital Library (IEEE); 
 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Xplore Digital Library; 
 ProQuest; 
 Science Direct; 
 Google; and 
 Google Scholar. 
In addition to those listed above, one additional database and government defense-
focused online search engine utilized is the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC). This 
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is a government site that allows a user to search more than one million final reports on defense 
funded research, development, test and evaluation activities. 
 Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) 
 Documentation approach. Document and capture of all references takes place using two 
distinct methods. The first (and primary) method includes the use of Microsoft Word. Capture of 
all relevant searches occur within a Microsoft Word document and include citation information, 
abstract, associated online location data, and assigned color category. For resources found to 
have some relevance to the problem, but not included within the Annotated Bibliography section, 
each of these resources receives a yellow category assignment. The green category assigned to 
all formally cited references found within the study provides a clear delineation between the two 
utilized categories. This information allows quick key word and assigned color category searches 
of all gathered references, and hyperlinked direct access to many relevant documents. This 
method also provides a back-up of all identified resources in the event of file corruption or 
deletion. Saving of these files on an encrypted USB drive and within two separate folders on a 
local hard drive provide additional data redundancy. 
 The second (and alternate) method for reference documentation and capture is the use of 
the Zotero online citation organization tool. This method focuses on key terms and allows for an 
online accessible secondary source for gathered reference data. This method is an additional 
backup in the event of the main reference Word Document data corruption or file loss. 
 Reference evaluation criteria. The selection of all references in the Annotated 
Bibliography section of this paper are evaluated in accordance with the University of Florida 
Center for Public Issues in Education Evaluation Information Sources fact sheet (Center for 
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Public Issues, 2014). The criteria used to evaluate all included references focuses on identifying 
characteristics to check for authority, timeliness, quality, relevancy, and bias (Center for Public 
Issues, 2014). 
 Authority. A strong focus is placed on looking at the author’s credentials, professional 
experience and overall credibility within the realm of the DoD information technology and       
C-IED operations. In addition to verifying the author's credentials, peer-reviewed sources are 
given preference. 
 Timeliness. For a reference deemed to be relevant and appropriate to the problem, the 
date of publication is considered. This study is limited to works published between 2012 and 
2016 based on C-IED operations and associated technologies rapidly advancing to counter new 
and emerging global threats. 
 Quality. For all relevant references identified a check for accurate grammar, spelling and 
punctuation is required (Center for Public Issues, 2014). A strong focus on government and 
military references assisted with confirming the overall quality of all references. 
 Relevancy.  References considered relevant to the study address the research questions 
and align with the most current information and data regarding C-IED operations and the 
associated legacy information technology systems utilized in the field today. 
 Bias. All identified resources are reviewed to determine if the author has a particular bias 
or if their goal is to sell a service or persuade a reader to their viewpoint (Center for Public 
Issues, 2014). Also, a check is completed to ensure the author’s arguments and conclusions are 
supported by credible and cited sources (Center for Public Issues, 2014). 
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Annotated Bibliography 
The following Annotated Bibliography presents 15 selected references that examine the 
DoD’s global C-IED fight and the use of legacy systems in support of IED exploitation 
operations required to achieve actionable intelligence. References selected help C-IED focused 
organizations, operators, and leaders address the current availability of actionable intelligence 
gained through successful IED exploitation. References presented in three categories describe 
three operational focal points aligned with legacy systems and the global fight against the IED: 
(a) evolving threats posed by the use of IED’s, (b) challenges posed by legacy systems in 
countering IED threats, and (c) information sharing and countering IED threats. 
Each annotation consists of three elements: (a) the full bibliographic citation, (b) author 
provided abstract, and (c) summary describing the relevance to this study. The abstracts included 
are either complete as published, or modified for length and/or content in order to align with the 
C-IED fight and legacy system problem area focus. The summaries for each reference highlight 
the global IED threat and the operational actions taken by the C-IED community to gather and 
share IED exploitation data.   
Category 1: Evolving Threats Posed by the Use of IED’s  
Bennett, B. A. (2013). Counter-improvised explosive device fusion cells and the brigade combat 
team: A modern day imperative [Monograph]. Retrieved from 
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA60604
6 
Abstract. The IED has been responsible for more deaths and injuries than any other 
weapons system in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite a $58 billion dollar investment in 
C-IED capability, the DoD has been unable to prevent this weapon from achieving 
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devastating effects on military and civilian targets and threatening national objectives. 
Within the Army, continued organizational refinements to fighting formations combined 
with formalization of specific capabilities will better prepare units for operations in high 
intensity IED environments. Specifically, the creation of an organic Brigade Combat 
Team C-IED fusion cell, sufficiently manned and singularly responsible for the 
integration and synchronization of all C-IED initiatives, will significantly improve 
targeting activities within the Brigade Combat Team and enable a more offensive posture 
when confronted with active IED threats.  
Summary. This paper examines the evolving IED threat and the creation and 
implementation of the C-IED fusion cell as a possible solution to increasing actionable 
intelligence. It takes a high level look into C-IED operations and the need for combat 
leaders to have better information capabilities. The use of legacy information gathering, 
storage, and sharing systems impact this information flow. The author focuses on the IED 
as a weapons system and its use against United States forces in Iraq and Afghanistan to 
cause death and injuries. The paper clearly highlights the evolving IED environment is 
too complex and too lethal, requiring a sufficiently manned and dedicated staff element 
assigned the primary responsibility for integrating C-IED information and synchronizing 
C-IED activities. The author discusses how integrating C-IED information and 
synchronizing associated activities is key to mitigating the effects of the IED, and the 
implementation of a C-IED fusion cell providing an alternative solution to the use of 
legacy information systems and processes. The author describes how the C-IED fusion 
cell and use of new data gathering and sharing technologies provide a more thorough IED 
analysis and increased information dissemination among C-IED organizations. The paper 
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provides trends relating to continued global proliferation of IED technology and the 
affinity terrorists and insurgents have with the IED, and the reality combat leaders must 
be prepared to fight the IED in future conflicts for many years to come. 
Joint IED Defeat Organization [JIEDDO] (2012). Counter-improvised explosive device strategic 
plan: JIEDDO 2012-2016. Retrieved from 
https://www.jieddo.mil/content/docs/20120106_JIEDDOC-
IEDStrategicPlan_MEDprint.pdf 
 Abstract. This document discusses how JIEDDO uses a synchronized and integrated 
approach to coordinate the DoD’s C-IED efforts and rapidly provide capabilities to 
counter the IED threat in support of operational commanders. Critical to these efforts are 
forces trained in the latest C-IED techniques and provided with tailored and fused 
intelligence support. As authorized, JIEDDO provides support to other federal agencies 
as they analyze, pursue, disrupt, protect, and respond to the terrorist use of explosives in 
the United States. JIEDDO will also aggressively seek to maintain the research and 
development advantages needed to neutralize the IED threat. 
 Summary. The document focuses on the IED and C-IED strategy the United States and 
its allies implement across the globe. The author focuses on the need to utilize a 
synchronized and integrated approach to coordinate the DoD’s C-IED efforts providing 
relevance to the study and highlighting the need for increased actionable intelligence in 
the fight against IED’s. A key component of achieving actionable intelligence is through 
the use of the DoD’s information technology systems and associated databases currently 
deployed around the globe. This key information directly addresses the main study 
question regarding the impact decentralized legacy systems have on the gathering, 
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analysis and sharing of IED exploitation data, and the availability of actionable 
intelligence. The strategy also notes critical C-IED capabilities and solutions, and looks 
closely at the strategic environment and enduring threat posed by the evolving IED 
tactics, techniques, and procedures used by the enemy. The author notes the leveraging of 
current C-IED research and development (R&D) ensures innovation, addressing future 
challenges and providing a venue to discover and develop C-IED centric technology to 
aid with countering threats and creating actionable intelligence. The strategy provides a 
comprehensive response to the complex and dynamic threat of evolving IED’s and 
involves the fusion of exploitation information, analysis, and partner support. All of 
which are critical components required to achieve actionable intelligence. 
Obama, B. (2013). Countering improvised explosive devices. Washington, DC: Executive Office 
of the President. Retrieved from 
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA57450
4 
 Abstract. This policy statement discusses how the government has no greater 
responsibility than providing for the safety and security for the United States citizens, 
allies, and partners, while providing an economic environment that promotes opportunity 
and prosperity. The use of IED’s threatens these interests by killing, injuring, and 
intimidating citizens and political leaders around the world, inflicting damage on United 
States forces on the battlefield, and disrupting transportation and the flow of commerce. 
The terrorists and criminals responsible for these attacks are resilient, technologically 
adept, and adaptable. They employ the most recent and successful tactics, techniques, and 
procedures gained from experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the world. The use 
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of IEDs worldwide has increased in recent years, with the number of attacks exceeding 
4,000 in 2011. 
 Summary. The 2013 policy statement issued by United States President Barrack Obama 
discusses how IEDs remain one of the most accessible weapons available to terrorists and 
criminals to damage critical infrastructure and inflict casualties and closely aligns with 
the main and sub-questions of the study. The policy focuses on leveraging, integrating, 
and aligning the United States Government C-IED efforts and enhancing information 
sharing resources across the United States Government. A major focal point is the need to 
effectively exploit information and materials from IED attacks conducted around the 
globe providing relevance to the study. Coordinating IED collection and exploitation 
efforts assists with gathering, sharing, and analyzing critical forensic, technical, and 
biometric information associated with incidents. The policy statement further identifies 
the critical need to maintain scalable and layered C-IED capabilities, including personnel 
and equipment. This includes enhancing legacy information technologies employed in 
support of the current C-IED fight and ensuring C-IED focused organizations have access 
to advanced analytic tools to better link IED related information across all collection 
sources. The desired end state for all C-IED operations is to gain actionable intelligence 
in order to counter the use of the IED across the globe. 
Smith, T. B., & Tranchemontagne, M. (2014). Understanding the enemy: The enduring value of 
technical and forensic exploitation. Joint Force Quarterly 75, 4, 122-128. Retrieved from 
http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA622235 
Abstract. This article discusses how the escalation of IED incidents and related 
casualties during Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom led to a new 
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intelligence field related to technical intelligence (TECHINT) called weapons technical 
intelligence (WTI), which combined technical and forensic IED exploitation techniques 
to link persons, places, things, and events. WTI operationalizes technical and forensic 
activities by fusing the technical, forensic, and biometric disciplines to produce 
actionable intelligence for countering threat networks. It is an especially powerful tool 
against terrorist organizations that rely on IEDs as a primary weapon in their arsenals.  
Summary. This article closely aligns with the study and specifically with the value IED 
technical and forensic exploitation data provides C-IED organizations. With the IED 
threat evolving, a need to identify more advanced techniques and procedures to counter 
this weapon becomes a reality, and the need to enhance the information sharing platforms 
and technologies is a requirement for all C-IED focused organizations. To successfully 
conduct IED exploitation, the authors note that improved planning and interagency 
cooperation is required. The interagency sharing of information requires the use of both 
legacy and enhanced information systems, and fusing of critical technical, forensic, and 
biometric information into actionable intelligence permits more precise shaping of the 
operational environment for combatant commanders resulting in the identification and 
capture of high value individuals.  
Category 2: Challenges Posed By Legacy Systems in Countering IED Threats 
Agarwal, S., Pape, L. E., Dagli, C. H., Ergin, N. K., Enke, D., Gosavi, A., & Gottapu, R. D. 
(2015). Flexible and intelligent learning architectures for SoS (FILA-SoS): Architectural 
evolution in systems-of-systems. Procedia Computer Science, 44, 76-85.  
doi:10.1016/j.procs.2015.03.005 
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Abstract. This article discusses how the dynamic planning for a system-of-systems (SoS) 
is a challenging endeavor. DoD programs constantly face challenges to incorporate new 
systems and upgrade existing systems over a period of time under threats, constrained 
budget, and uncertainty. It is therefore necessary for the DoD to be able to look at the 
future scenarios and critically assess the impact of technology and stakeholder changes. 
The DoD currently is looking for options that signify affordable acquisition selections 
and lessen the cycle time for early acquisition and new technology addition.  
Summary. This article discusses the interoperability conditions that exist between new 
and legacy DoD systems and possible solutions to overcome current performance issues 
related to the study. The author focuses on the DoD architecture evolution in context of 
SoS approach. The authors look to provide evidence the SoS approach and methodology 
takes into account the availability of legacy DoD systems and the many new systems 
required to adapt to rapidly changing mission specifics. The authors describe the SoS 
approach and methodology of consisting of many autonomous systems and their inter-
connections, leading to a greater capability that fulfills the demand of a specific task. To 
accomplish this, the authors utilize current examples of legacy systems in use and 
supporting the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) combat mission. ISR 
is a critical component of the C-IED fight and requires a great deal of data exchange 
between organizations. The need for enhanced data transfer functionality and capabilities 
is a key component of the evolution into a SoS approach. 
Alexandrova, A., Rapanotti, L., & Horrocks, I. (2015, May). The legacy problem in government 
agencies: An exploratory study. Proceedings of the 16th Annual International 
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Conference on Digital Government Research, UK, 150-159. Retrieved from 
http://oro.open.ac.uk/42604/1/dgo_2015_submission_11.pdf 
 Abstract. This study focuses on how government organizations continue to be heavily 
reliant on legacy systems to support their mission-critical functions. When practitioners 
embark on legacy systems replacement projects, they tend to use the legacy software's 
features as business requirements for its replacement application. This unnecessarily 
reproduces the business processes that have often emerged from the very technical 
limitations of the legacy system being phased out -- a phenomenon referred to as the 
"legacy problem." Overcoming the legacy problem is difficult because of the complex 
interrelationships of information technology, organizational culture, and government 
agencies' normative environments. As a result, legacy feature carryover occurs frequently 
within government organizations, because practitioners want to minimize business 
process changes during new system implementation. The study findings single out the 
procurement of commercial off the shelf (COTS) software as the most common approach 
to the replacement of legacy systems. The study findings assist government agencies with 
devising solutions for dealing with the legacy problem. 
 Summary. This study discusses how legacy systems are a known challenge for the 
operations of modern organizations, as they limit the capacity for change and overall 
growth. The authors highlight substantial investments the United States Government 
made in legacy systems since 2010, and the operational impacts these systems have on 
many operational levels and individual mission sets. A key link to the challenges legacy 
systems pose for countering IED threats is the discussion by the authors of how 
government agencies teeter between innovation and continuing to support the legacy 
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systems implemented and actively in use. The authors also discuss how government 
organizations define individualized operational requirements. This process may include 
the replacement of legacy systems in order to successfully complete evolving missions. 
Many government organizations (to include those focused on the C-IED fight) must 
conduct a balancing act between preserving the core mission functionalities supported by 
each legacy system and introducing newly enhanced features capable of increasing 
organizational efficiency and effectiveness. The article additionally highlights that the 
legacy problem involves dynamic interplay of technology, individuals and rigid 
organizational structures making a transition to new enhanced technological solutions 
very difficult.  
Barno, D., Bensahel, N., Stokes, J., Smith, J., & Kidder, K. (2013). The seven deadly sins of 
defense spending. Retrieved from Center for a New American Security website: 
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_SevenDeadlySIns.pdf 
Abstract. The authors of this article discuss how the DoD faces a stark choice. With 
reductions in defense spending looming, decisions made during the next year will chart 
one of two paths: one that avoids tough choices about cutting excess and inefficiencies, 
or one that embraces painful but necessary reforms to the structural underpinnings of the 
department. The first path will inevitably follow the precedent of past defense budget 
drawdowns and lead to deep cuts in force structure, readiness and modernization, and 
produce a much-diminished United States military. The other, more difficult, path 
preserves these capabilities by fundamentally reforming the underlying causes of DoD 
cost growth. With the right choices for reform, the United States defense establishment 
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can consume fewer resources and still meet America’s global strategy requirements for 
many decades to come – but bold and resolute action is required now. 
Summary. This report looks closely at the DoD’s defense spending and the ability to 
perform its core missions going forward into the future, with one of the most critical 
missions consisting of the C-IED fight. The authors focus on several key areas aligned 
with identification of redundant DoD organizations and the use of legacy systems related 
to C-IED operations and the impact this causes. The authors note that as the IED became 
the signature weapon for enemy forces around the world, the DoD rapidly increased 
funding to ensure greater safety for combat forces. Increased funding provides a new 
focus on intelligence gathering tools and processes aimed at identifying and prosecuting 
those responsible for the emplacement and use of IED’s. With the rapid funding push, the 
authors highlight many military services and agencies began overlapping IED related 
intelligence analysis, C-IED hardware development and IED detection and technologies. 
In addition to the C-IED overlap the authors note the need for implementation of more 
efficient and interoperable DoD systems. The heavy use of legacy systems and 
technologies in support of current C-IED operations drives this urgent need. 
Department of the Army. (2013). Annual report on business transformation: 
Providing readiness at best value (1 March 2013 Report). Retrieved from 
http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/2013ArmyAnnualReportlBusine
ssTransformation.pdf 
 Abstract. This report discusses how the emerging environment presents a complex range 
of threats, challenges and opportunities, making it likely that United States forces will be 
called on to fulfill a broad range of military operations. The Army will prevent conflict 
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by remaining a credible force with sufficient capacity to dissuade adversaries from 
challenging American interests. The Army will shape the environment, building positive 
relationships and capabilities that enable nations to effectively protect and govern their 
citizenry. Finally, when called, the Army will fight for the Nation and win decisively and 
dominantly. At the same time, fiscal constraints require us to deliver strategic land power 
in the most cost-effective way possible. 
 Summary. This report addresses the challenges posed by numerous evolving global 
threats, and specifically how these affect the United States Army. As one of the largest 
DoD military components participating in the C-IED fight, the report discusses the 
approach for enhancing current and legacy combat systems and the associated network 
capabilities utilized globally. The authors focus on the expeditionary aspect of the Army 
and its need to create a single, secure and standards-based digital environment within 
which information technology programs operate. The study highlights several reforms 
identified to assist the Army with implementing a network modernization strategy, and 
possible solutions for addressing the overall study problem. The need to improve 
regulations for developing and enforcing architecture rules aimed at reducing waste and 
risk to the Army’s information technology (IT) systems. The report also provides critical 
relevant information regarding the development of a common operating environment 
including enhanced user identification, management uniformity, situational awareness 
and increased system interoperability. 
Goerger S. R., Madni, A. M., & Eslinger, O. J. (2014). Engineered resilient systems: A DoD 
perspective. Procedia Computer Science.28, 865-872.doi: 10.1016/j.procs.2014.03.103 
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Abstract. This article discusses how DoD systems are required to be trusted and effective 
in a wide range of operational contexts with the ability to respond to new or changing 
conditions through modified tactics, appropriate reconfiguration, or replacement. As 
importantly, these systems are required to exhibit predictable and graceful degradation 
outside their designed performance envelope. For these systems to be included in the 
force structure, they need to be manufacturable, readily deployable, sustainable, easily 
modifiable, and cost-effective. Collectively, these requirements inform the definition of 
resilient DoD systems. This paper explores the properties and tradeoffs for engineered 
resilient systems in the military context. It reviews various perspectives on resilience, 
overlays DoD requirements on these perspectives, and presents DoD challenges in 
realizing and rapidly fielding resilient systems. This paper also presents promising 
research themes pursued by the research community to help the DoD realize the vision of 
affordable, adaptable, and effective systems. This paper concludes with a discussion of 
specific DoD systems that can potentially benefit from resilience and stresses the need for 
sustaining a community of interest in this important area.  
Summary. This article focuses heavily on the mission of the DoD to equip and deploy 
military forces as required to deter war and assure national security. This focus aligns 
closely with the study’s main question regarding the use of legacy information systems, 
and the availability of actionable intelligence achieved through the use of the DoD’s 
complex cyber infrastructure systems, logistical data and deployed information systems 
operating around the globe. The authors look closely at the DoD’s legacy military 
systems and the topic of resiliency for these systems.  In addition to resiliency the authors 
highlight the rapid changes in DoD missions and mission requirements, as well as the 
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emergence of new asymmetric threats in today’s operational environment. A large and 
growing asymmetric threat is the use of the IED by terrorists and enemy combatants 
conducting operations throughout many areas of the world, requiring a unique operational 
systems footprint to combat the threat. Possible enhancements to current DoD systems 
noted by the authors include development of more affordably adaptable and effective 
systems identified through the close examination of current DoD mission volatility.  
Patacsil, J. A. (2013). Sustaining eleven years of counter-improvised explosive device relevancy 




Abstract. Since the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom and continuing through Operation 
Enduring Freedom and Operation New Dawn, a weapon that is simplistic, inexpensive 
has plagued United States forces, and effective known as the lED. C-IED has thus been a 
major focus ever since. This focus has evolved so much that in 2006 the Joint lED Defeat 
Organization (JIEDDO) was established to address the lED issue, which has been the 
greatest cause of U.S. casualties since the start of the Global War on Terror. Those same 
critics believe that the time has come for the Marine Corps to focus on its foundation of 
expeditionary warfare. And their desires may come to fruition as United States forces 
have already withdrawn from Iraq, will soon be withdrawing from Afghanistan, and will 
shift its focus to the Pacific Theater. Despite this however, through creative alternatives 
and adjusting budget priorities the DoD can effectively sustain and improve its C-IED 
capabilities which will undoubtedly be necessary for future global conflicts. 
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Summary. This paper focuses heavily on the requirement for the DoD to improve IED 
threat-intelligence gathering operations, the acquisition of enhanced C-IED technologies 
and systems, and increased C-IED training for United States service members operating 
on today’s battlefield. The author describes intelligence information fusion, collaboration, 
and analytical support to combatant commands are key pillars in the fight against the IED 
threat. A critical link to the study and main question is the discussion of the current strain 
placed upon intelligence resources supporting both C-IED and non C-IED missions on 
the battlefield, and the associated unique organizational systems and processes in use by 
each. The author highlights the lack of a DoD or individual military service 
standardization requirement for the many C-IED technologies and methodologies 
currently employed. These C-IED technologies and methodologies include the use of 
many legacy information systems and associated infrastructures with the DoD footprint.  
Stevens, G. D. (2012). Whole of government approach to countering domestic IED’s: 
Leveraging military capabilities. (Civilian Research Report 29-05-2012). Retrieved from 
the Defense Technical Information Center website: 
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA59337
8 
Abstract. Law enforcement authorities, together with the intelligence community, have 
been successful in thwarting many recently attempted IED attacks targeting the United 
States. However, the potential for a sustained IED campaign against our nation remains. 
Considering that the means available to respond to domestic IEDs have grown 
considerably with Homeland Security grants, the issuance of Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive-19, and the recent expansion of military counter-IED capabilities, 
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we have a responsibility to optimize these resources to provide our nation with the best 
possible response. Moreover, current fiscal constraints demand a more efficient use of 
our ample resources in this critical area of vulnerability. Shortfalls in current law, 
military doctrine, organizational structure, training, and information sharing protocols are 
preventing an optimized and united, or whole of government approach to addressing this 
threat as called for in HSPD-19 and the National Security Strategy. This paper explores 
these shortfalls and recommends several solutions. Chief among them is establishment of 
a DoD C-IED Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters to facilitate improved response, 
training, and sharing of information from military EOD forces in support of civil law 
enforcement authorities. 
Summary. This paper discusses the shortfalls in current law, policy and practice related 
to C-IED support, coordination and information exchange within the DoD. The author 
calls for the establishment of a DoD C-IED Joint Task Force (JTF) focusing on 
facilitating improved IED response, training and sharing of associated information. This 
information aligns closely with the study and assists with gaining a better perspective of 
several legacy DoD IED information gathering and sharing systems that enable C-IED 
focused organizations to obtain critical device trends and observed enemy tactics utilized 
when employing these deadly devices. The author also includes relevant information 
regarding the possible use and the countering of IED’s within the United States. This 
provides a great deal of information regarding the opportunities for increased data sharing 
amongst all C-IED organizations within the DoD and externally. The need to gain 
actionable intelligence requires the most current information systems, databases, and 
processes, in addition to use of lessons learned from the large volume of IED 
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exploitations conducted during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The author notes the 
lack of any centralized effort to consolidate and share domestic IED incident reports 
amongst EOD units and other C-IED organizations external to the DoD. 
Category 3: Information Sharing and Countering IED Threats  
Carter, J. G. (2015). Inter-organizational relationships and law enforcement information sharing 
post 11 September 2001. Journal of Crime and Justice, 38(4), 522-542. Retrieved from 
https://scholarworks.iupui.edu/bitstream/handle/1805/4544/carter-2014-inter-
organizational.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=n 
Abstract. This article discusses the lack of information sharing among law enforcement 
agencies leading up to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Contemporary counter-
terrorism efforts place an emphasis on interaction among law enforcement agencies with 
other government and private sector organizations. The present research utilizes two 
federally-funded national surveys to explore the collaborative relationships between law 
enforcement, other government organizations, and private sector organizations. Findings 
suggest collaboration across sectors exists, however it appears significant room for 
improvement remains. 
Summary. This article focuses on intelligence information sharing between 
organizations as a tactical means to prevent and mitigate threats of terrorism and crime as 
key in the C-IED fight. The author focuses on the events following the September 11, 
2001 attacks, and the findings of the 9/11 Commission Report. This report highlighted 
information sharing failures existed across all levels of law enforcement and counter-
terrorism focused organizations, similar to those observed throughout all organizations 
conducting counter terrorism operations. The need for increased situational awareness 
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sparks the development of fusion centers and departure from legacy systems to facilitate 
the sharing of information and intelligence across organizational boundaries. As utilized 
within the C-IED fight the fusion center (or cell) actively assists with collecting, 
analyzing, and disseminating critical information and intelligence. The fusion center 
concept requires the use of many unique information technology systems to execute 
critical data gathering and dissemination. The collection and analysis of information 
results in actionable intelligence.  
Deni, J. R. (2015). Beyond information sharing: NATO and the foreign fighter threat. 
Parameters, 45(2), 47-60. Retrieved from 
http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Issues/Summer_2015/8_Deni.pd
f 
Abstract. This article discusses that despite disagreement among experts and 
policymakers over its significance, the foreign fighter threat to Europe is very real. 
Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), such as NATO, have an important role to play 
in countering this threat, including through information sharing. Even though the North 
Atlantic alliance has its hands full at the moment, member states can further leverage 
NATO’s unique advantages. 
Summary. This article focuses on the critical need to share intelligence information 
between counter terrorism organizations operating around the globe in order to reduce the 
possibility of future high profile attacks. The author focuses on the specific issue of 
foreign fighters and the threat each poses. Bilateral and multilateral exchanges of 
information and other forms of collaboration highlight the critical need to gather and 
share intelligence data as a means of countering the terrorist threat. The United States 
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plays a critical role in this information exchange, along with assisting nations with 
standardizing and institutionalizing common practices for sharing information and 
countering terrorist attacks and the use of IED’s. Key elements of the article include the 
launching of a five-year security strategy for the European Union (EU), and strong focus 
on information technology enhancements to encourage increased organizational 
collaboration.  
Flynn, M. T., & Flynn, C. A. (2012). Integrating intelligence and information: Ten points for the 
commander. Military Review, 92(1), 4-8. Retrieved from 
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_201202
29_art005.pdf 
Abstract. This article discusses after ten years of war, there are a number of truisms 
developed from hard-fought battlefield experience. One that has gained prominence is the 
concept of intelligence and information integration. Integrating intelligence and 
information means different things to different people, but one thing is certain: without 
integration, the entire decision-making process is compromised, rife with gaps that can 
lead to miscalculations. The article is a compilation of thoughts and ideas the authors call 
“Ten Points for the Commander.”  
Summary. This article aligns closely with the study based on the strong focus regarding 
the integration of intelligence and information across today’s battlefield. The authors 
discuss the need to create a data gathering and analysis solution aligned with the 
operational environment where the volume and velocity of information is at its highest 
levels. The authors utilize their own extensive personal combat experiences to discuss the 
fusion of battlefield intelligence data requires the focusing of the many diverse 
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information collection systems currently in use. The authors note the need to 
communicate and disseminate information data rapidly up, down, and laterally across 
organizations without restrictions is a critical need in order to achieve increased levels of 
actionable intelligence.  A key component of the article is the discussion on how the 
intelligence community as a whole needs to view itself as the critical enabling capability 
of decision making, whether is at the tactical or strategic level.  
Rubin, D., Lynch, K., Escaravage, J., & Lerner, H. (2014). Harnessing data for national security. 
The SAIS Review of International Affairs, 34(1), 121-128. Retrieved from 
http://libproxy.uoregon.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.uoregon.edu/d
ocview/1552151745?accountid=14698  
Abstract. This article discusses that since 9/11, the United States government has 
initiated efforts to enhance its information-sharing capabilities and doubled its investment 
in counterterrorism, spending nearly $80 billion. Sharing data and conducting analyses 
across the government's legacy stovepipes of information is challenging but mandatory to 
reduce redundancy, increase cost efficiency, and improve national security mission 
performance. The challenges involved in harnessing big data analytics for a more 
enlightened approach to national security center on striking the optimal balance between 
complex opposing forces-opportunity versus risk, collective security versus individual 
privacy, and innovation versus protection. While the government has made progress in 
identifying existing data sources and sharing high-level metadata, it is still in the early 
phases of the maturity curve in terms of enabling access across the federal ecosystem to 
leverage the valuable analytics that inform evidence-driven decision-making. This paper 
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explores the strategies and frameworks to expedite effectively analyzing and using data to 
drive national security activities.  
Summary. This article aligns with the study by discussing data sharing and conducting 
analyses across the legacy DoD networks and associated government systems. The 
authors focus on reducing systems redundancy, increasing cost efficiency, and improving 
overall national security mission performance within the government defense space. The 
author notes a more productive and leaner government enterprise will assist with 
harnessing the large amounts of existing data it currently has at its disposal. This is a 
critical need in support of current C-IED operations and especially for organizations 
gathering, storing, and sharing large amounts of exploitation data.  The author notes there 
are many challenges involved in harnessing data analytics through the use of the 
government’s current information systems, and without this critical information 
evidence-driven decision making is not possible. The author also highlights that our 
connected society of today continuously produces valuable data, which is key in 
providing real-time and strategic intelligence related to terrorist activities.
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Conclusion 
Common ideas, operational processes, and organizational performance information 
identified during the analysis of the selected references focus on the critical C-IED mission. This 
information serves to provide DoD C-IED mission focused government, civilian, and contractor 
organizations a better understanding of the mission impacting interoperability conditions that 
exist between new and legacy information technology systems. This information also serves to 
highlight the critical need to identify more effective and efficient mission enhancing alternatives 
to achieving actionable intelligence. Relevant recommendations consist of both qualitative and 
quantitative scholarly articles, books, published white papers, and civilian and government 
websites.  
Each of the organizing themes used to frame the presentation of the references annotated 
in this study highlights the critical need to achieve increased levels of actionable intelligence as 
the global IED threat expands and evolves, and the methods for accomplishing this. Themes 
include (a) evolving threats posed by the use of IED’s; (b) challenges posed by legacy systems in 
countering IED threats; and (c) information sharing and countering IED threats. 
Evolving Threats Posed by the Use of IED’s 
 The IED environment is constantly evolving and the technological and information 
gathering solutions designed to counter these deadly devices have a limited time frame (Bennett, 
2013). In this study, the focus on the evolving threat posed by the IED around the globe has 
confirmed the need for C-IED focused organizations to rapidly reduce the effectiveness and 
lethality of IED’s to allow freedom of maneuver for joint forces, federal agencies, and partner 
nations (JIEDDO, 2012). This requires C-IED organizations to aggressively seek to maintain 
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high levels of research and development (R&D) aimed at achieving increased levels of 
actionable intelligence and neutralizing the global IED threat.  
The literature indicates the IED threat consists of an overlapping consortium of networks 
spanning the entire threat continuum including criminal gangs, insurgencies, and terrorists who 
maintain a global reach and use the IED as a common weapon of choice (JIEDDO, 2012). As the 
IED threat continues to evolve across the globe this deadly weapon remains one of the most 
accessible tools utilized to inflict fear and casualties (Obama, 2013). As the individual IED 
devices become more technologically advanced and widespread, the requirements to effectively 
exploit information and materials from attacks are a key to successfully countering this global 
threat (Obama, 2013). 
The literature also indicates the IED poses a fundamental, significant and enduring threat 
for the foreseeable future (Smith & Tranchemontagne, 2014). Smith and Tranchemontagne 
(2014) specifically note that the enduring threat has resulted in C-IED organizations 
operationalizing technical and forensic activities by fusing the technical, forensic, and biometric 
disciplines to produce actionable intelligence used to counter threat networks. This shift provides 
the ability to conduct relevant and timely collection, analysis, and technical and forensic 
exploitation of current and emerging IED technologies (JIEDDO, 2012). The study confirmed 
the capture and analysis of large amounts of associated information require the use of many 
information technologies and platforms across the DoD spectrum. Many of these decentralized 
forward deployed technologies and platforms do not always have connectivity back to a United 
States based network, and considered legacy systems that impact current operations 
(Witherspoon et al., 2014).  
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Challenges Posed By Legacy Systems in Countering IED Threats 
 Legacy systems found throughout many United States government organizations and 
agencies required an estimated $35.7 billion spent on their support and upkeep in 2010 alone as 
noted by Alexandrova et al. (2015). The large amount of funding dedicated to maintaining legacy 
systems places a financial and operational burden on many organizations, and has a profound 
impact on operations such as those conducted to counter the evolving global IED threat 
(Alexandrova et al., 2015). Many of the existing legacy systems utilized by government 
organizations are “slow, duplicative, and lacking interoperability” (Barno et al., 2013, p.19). The 
study highlighted the need for the DoD to introduce more efficient and interoperable systems 
aimed at achieving greater levels of actionable intelligence. This becomes a reality with today’s 
rapid changes in missions and mission requirements, as well as the emergence of new 
asymmetric threats found within a complex operational environment (Goerger et al., 2014). 
 The study also highlighted challenges posed by legacy systems in the fight to counter the 
global IED threat and the limited ability to fully synchronize and integrate all available C-IED 
capabilities and associated IED exploitation information for operating forces forward deployed 
(Patacsil, 2013). The literature identifies the use of legacy systems to support the C-IED fight 
directly impacts information sharing connections between C-IED organizations, in addition to 
highlighting the widespread use of separate databases and differing methods for securing and 
facilitating data movements across government networks (Rubin et al., 2014). The decentralized 
network of information C-IED gathering, analysis, sharing and operations limits the forward 
deployed combatant commander’s ability to achieve and utilize actionable intelligence to counter 
the IED threat (Smith & Tranchemontagne, 2014).    
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 The literature also indicates that to achieve increased levels of actionable intelligence, the 
IED must be viewed as an intelligence opportunity that can yield information about the network 
of bomb designers, builders, emplacers, triggermen, financiers, component suppliers, and 
operational leaders who make up the complex web of actors who execute IED attacks (Smith & 
Tranchemontagne, 2014). All of this information must be gathered, analyzed, and disseminated 
through many currently utilized decentralized DoD legacy systems that lack the ability to 
complete this task in real-time (Barno et al., 2013). 
Information Sharing and Countering IED Threats 
 Countering the global IED threat requires collection and analysis of large amounts 
information that includes biographic, biometric, and forensics data, along with the use of 
network analysis for linking identities to places, activities, to those directly responsible for the 
fabrication and use of IED’s (Voelz, 2015).  The literature highlights that today’s fight against 
the IED threat is unlike the analytical challenges of industrial age warfare, requiring 
development and implementation of new tools, systems, and methods for collecting, processing, 
and communicating information across the entire United States Government security apparatus 
(Voelz, 2015). The study focuses on the information sharing relationships post September 11, 
2001. This tragic event markes the transformation point for current intelligence gathering and 
sharing practices utilized by the United States (Carter, 2015).     
 Flynn and Flynn (2012) note that focusing and fusing of current intelligence and 
information collection systems, assists with successfully countering the IED threat, and provides 
C-IED organizations with the ability to communicate rapidly up, down, and laterally without 
restrictions. Flynn and Flynn (2012) explain that enhanced information flow is achieved through 
the creation of a dedicated C-IED fusion cell and the use of enhanced information systems and 
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infrastructure. The fusion cell acts as a single point for the synchronization of gathered C-IED 
information helping provide more reliable and credible actionable intelligence (Flynn & Flynn, 
2012). The literature indicates information sharing is a key component of countering global IED 
threats. For example, enhanced intelligence information allows operational commanders to 
interrupt an enemy’s decision cycle and interdict IED tactical employment in real-time (Smith & 
Tranchemontagne, 2014). The literature also highlights the requirement for enhancing 
information sharing and collaboration efforts to prevent, prohibit, and respond to the growing 
global terrorist and IED threats (Deni, 2015).    
In summary, the references included in this study identify legacy systems as known 
challenges for many government organizations as noted by Alexandrova et al., (2015). These 
challenges directly impact achieving greater levels of actionable intelligence for those specific 
DoD organizations focused on the C-IED fight. To increase current levels of actionable 
intelligence in support of C-IED operations noted by Smith and Tranchemontagne (2014), 
government and military leaders must identify mission enhancing alternative solutions for the 
use of decentralized legacy information systems. As noted by Alexandrova et al. (2015), legacy 
systems present government organizations with a great deal of operational and financial risks. 
With these risks present along with the ever-evolving threat of the global IED, a “synchronized 
and integrated” JIEDDO (2012, p.1) approach of information gathering, analysis, and 
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Definitions 
 The definitions below describe technical and operational terminology as used in the 
annotated bibliography. Definitions derived from associated research literature: 
Actionable Intelligence- intelligence information that is directly useful to customers for 
immediate exploitation without having to go through the full intelligence production 
process (DoD, 2016 p. JP 1-02, 1). 
Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations (C-IED) - The organization, integration, 
and synchronization of capabilities that enable offensive, defensive, stability, and support 
operations across all phases of operations or campaigns in order to defeat improvised 
explosive devices as operational and strategic weapons of influence (DoD, 2016 p. JP 1-
02, 52). 
Counter-Terrorism- Activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists and their 
organizations and networks in order to render them incapable of using violence to instill 
fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals (DoD, 2016 p. JP 1-02, 
54). 
Exploitation-Taking full advantage of any information that has come to hand for tactical 
operational, or strategic purposes (DoD, 2016 p. JP 1-02, 83). 
Improvised Explosive Device (IED)- A weapon that is fabricated or emplaced in an 
unconventional manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary 
chemicals designed to kill, destroy, incapacitate, harass, deny mobility, or distract (DoD, 2016 p. 
JP 1-02, 108). 
